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Actualizado Febrero 2021
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EDUCACIÓN

- Ph.D. en Economía,
Toulouse School of Economics. 2020
- M.Phil. en Economía (Diplome Européen d'Economie Quantitative Approfondie),
Toulouse School of Economics 2015
- M.Sc. en "Economics of Markets and Organizations",
Toulouse School of Economics 2014
- Magíster en Economía,
Universidad de Chile 2012
- Ingeniero Comercial Mención Economía,
Universidad de Chile 2010

EXPERIENCIA DOCENTE

- Profesor de Cátedra:
Organización Industrial (pregrado),
Universidad de Chile Primavera-Verano 2012
- Ayudante de Cátedra:
Business Economics (magíster),
Toulouse School of Management 2017
- Organización Industrial, Econometría y Desarrollo Económico (pregrado),
Universidad de Chile 2008-2010

EXPERIENCIA PROFESIONAL

- Pasantía Académica,
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Anfitrión: Professor Gary Biglaiser Mayo-Julio 2019
- Economista fiscalizador,
Fiscalía Nacional Económica 2011-2013

-Ayudante de Investigación,
Universidad de Chile

2008-2010

INTERESES DE INVESTIGACIÓN

Organización industrial, economía digital, medios de pago.

CONFERENCES AND SEMINARS

2016: Conferencia EARIE (Lisboa, sesión: “Rising stars”).

2017: Seminario interno en Toulouse School of Economics.

2018: Conferencia EARIE (Atenas, sesión: “Rising stars”), Conferencia CRESSE (Creta), Workshop de libre competencia en Toulouse School of Economics, Seminario interno en Toulouse School of Economics.

2019: Seminario interno en University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.

BECAS

Beca para estudios de Magíster de Toulouse School of Economics.

2013

Beca Conicyt de Doctorado.

2014-2018

Beca de la Fundación Jean-Jacques Laffont.

2018-2019

IDIOMAS

Español (nativo), Inglés (profesional), Francés (avanzado)

COMPUTACIÓN

Stata, Matlab, L^AT_EX.

WORKING PAPERS

Multi-sided platforms and consumer obfuscation.

(Rising Stars Session 45th EARIE Annual Conference Athens)

Several antitrust authorities have investigated platform price parity clauses around the world. I analyze the impact of these clauses when platforms design a search environment for sellers and buyers to interact. In a model where platforms choose the unitary search cost faced by consumers, I show when it is profitable for platforms to obfuscate consumers through high search costs. Then, I show that price parity clauses, when exogenously given, can increase or reduce obfuscation, prices, and consumer surplus. Finally, when price parity clauses are endogenous, they are only observed in equilibrium if they hurt consumers.

Interchange fee regulation in the credit card market.

(Rising Stars Session 43rd EARIE Annual Conference Lisbon)

I study the credit card market from a multi-product perspective, where banks offer a payment card with a linked credit product. In this context, I provide a new explanation for credit card rewards and interest rate stickiness commonly observed in this market. Using this setting, we

study the impact of several antitrust and regulatory interventions to interchange fees in the credit card market. I derive the conditions under which these regulations are beneficial or detrimental to consumer surplus and total welfare, mainly depending on the relative costs and benefits of different forms of credit.

Coalition loyalty programs and the competition for prominence. (con Xavier Lambin)

We provide a new interpretation for coalition loyalty programs in an environment where consumers search for their preferred products. A dominant firm in one market can generate a prominent position for another firm in an unrelated market, by offering a reward to consumers conditionally on buying in both firms. We show when it is optimal for consumers to sample first the firms in the coalition. We derive conditions under which this coalition is profitable in comparison with a case with no coalition and in comparison with a case where the dominant firm creates a loyalty program only in its own market. We find that the coalition can be profitable if and only if it increases consumer surplus. Then, we explore the case where a continuum of coalitions compete, and show that in this case, consumer surplus is lower, industry profits are higher, and total welfare is ambiguous, relative with a case with no coalitions.